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1. Introduction
A number of approaches to image matching, such as
correlation in the space domain and using features as
typified by corners and edges, have been investigated. Phase-
only correlation (POC) is a frequency domain approach
to image matching. Phase-only correlation with discrete
Fourier transform (DFT) was first proposed by Kuglin
and Hines [1]. The translation between signals and the
direct measure of the degree of signal congruence can be
simultaneously estimated by POC based on the Fourier
shift property. In addition, the rotation and scaling can
be estimated using the magnitude of DFT coeﬃcients that
are mapped into log-polar coordinates [2]. High-accuracy
estimation by POC has been developed [3–5].
Generally, image matching using POC requires visual
protection of templates in order to secure privacy [6, 7].
Typically, encryption is used for the protection of signals
[8]. However, decryption is required before image matching
using POC. In order to address these problems, we previously
proposed a method for image matching that used synchro-
nized phase scrambling [9, 10]. The previously proposed
method enables direct image matching between protected
images. However, a key is required for both scrambling
and image matching, and the key must be kept secret from
attackers.
In one-time key based phase scrambling, a key is used
once for scrambling but is not required for image matching.
Moreover, after scrambling, the key can be discarded if
the template does not need to be reconstructed. Under
the limited two-member set, the eﬀect of scrambling on
POC values and the visual eﬀect are analyzed theoretically,
and these analyses provide a guideline for designing key
parameters. A key for which the parameters have been
chosen appropriately enables keyless image matching to be
performed by phase scrambling. Finally, experimental results
demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and appropriateness of the
proposed scrambling.
2. Preliminary
The goal of the proposed image matching method is
described in this section. Phase-only correlation and phase
scrambling for POC, which are elements of the proposed
method, are then explained. In the present paper, for the sake
of brevity, the one-dimensional case is considered. Let C, R,
and Z denote the sets of complex, real, and integer numbers,
respectively.
2.1. Goal of the Proposed Image Matching. Phase scrambling
protects the original information of images visually, as shown
in Figure 1. The phase scrambling for POC is performed in














Figure 1: Phase scrambling. The phase scrambling is accomplished
in the frequency domain. The inverse DFT of the DFT coeﬃcients
reveals the information of the template. Conversely, the inverse DFT
of the scrambled DFT coeﬃcients does not reveal the information
of the template.
the frequency domain. The DFT coeﬃcients of a signal are
scrambled by multiplying the coeﬃcients with random phase
terms. The inverse DFT of the scrambled DFT coeﬃcients
does not reveal the original information of the image,
whereas the inverse DFT of the DFT coeﬃcients reveals the
information of the original image.
The proposed image matching uses phase scrambling
in order to protect the original information of templates
visually in case there is leakage of the template. Image
matching between the phase-scrambled template and the
query can be performed by POC even if the sensed image
that is used as a query has translation, rotation, and scaling
for the corresponding template.
The diﬀerence between the previously proposed image
matching and the image matching proposed herein is shown
in Figure 2. In the previous method, the key used for the
phase scrambling of templates must be saved securely and
reused in the image matching by POC. On the other hand,
in the proposed method, the key used for phase scrambling
of templates is not required for image matching and does not
need to be saved. Independent keys are used for all templates
and the key is a one-use key.
2.2. POC
2.2.1. Translation. Let Gi(k), k = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1, i ∈
Z be the N-point DFT coeﬃcients of N-point signal,





where |Gi(k)| denotes the absolute value of Gi(k). If
|Gi(k)| = 0, then φGi(k) is replaced by 0.
Let g2(n) be the shifted signal of g1(n). The normalized
cross spectrum, Rφ(k), between g1(n) and g2(n) is defined in
terms of their corresponding phase terms φG1 (k) and φG2 (k)
as follows:
Rφ(k) = φ∗G1 (k) · φG2 (k), (2)
where φ∗G1 (k) denotes the complex conjugate of φG1 (k). The







whereWN denotes exp(− j2π/N) and j denotes
√−1 [1]. The
translation between two signals is estimated by the location
of the peak of rφ(n) in (3). In addition, the value of the peak
is used as a measure of the signal congruence.
2.2.2. Rotation and Scaling. Rotation and scaling between
two images are estimated by POC using the magnitude of
DFT coeﬃcients that are mapped into log-polar coordinates
[2]. Log-polar transform reduces the rotation angle and scale
factor in the Cartesian coordinates to horizontal and vertical
translation in log-polar coordinates.
2.3. Phase Scrambling for POC
2.3.1. Phase Scrambling and Phase-Scrambled Signal. Phase
scrambling for POC is performed in the frequency domain.
The phase-scrambled DFT coeﬃcients, G˜i(k), are defined as
G˜i(k) = Gi(k) · e jθαi (k), (4)
where θαi(k) denotes a key sequence and αi denotes an
identifier for the key sequence. Phase scrambling aﬀects only
the phase term, that is, the scrambled phase term, φ˜Gi(k), is
given as
φ˜Gi(k) = φGi · e jθαi (k). (5)
The phase-scrambled signal, g˜i(n), is defined by the






The phase-scrambled image is a two-dimensional expression
of the phase-scrambled signal.
A key sequence is constructed from a set of M members,
x1, x2, . . . , xM ∈ R, and the length of the key sequence is
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(b) proposed image matching
Figure 2: Diﬀerence between the previously proposed image matching and the image matching proposed herein. (a) Previously proposed
image matching. A key is required for scrambling both the templates and the query images. (b) Proposed image matching. A key is only used
for scrambling the templates. All of the templates can be scrambled by independent keys.
the same as that of the DFT coeﬃcients. That is, an M-ary
key sequence, θαi(k), is expressed with a set, U
M
x1 , as
θαi(k) ∈ UMx1 , ∀k,
UMx1 = {x1, x2, . . . , xM},
(7)
where, for convenience, the superscript and subscript of
the term UMx1 denote the number of members and the
first member, respectively. A key sequence can be generated
using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator, in which the random numbers are related to each
member of UMxi specified by the users. As M increases, the
key space increases, whereas the determination of members
becomes more complicated.
2.3.2. Image Matching under Synchronized Phase Scrambling.
The phase scrambled signal can be used directly for image
matching using POC.
Let g1(n) and g2(n) be a template and a query, respec-
tively. According to (4), g1(n) is scrambled by θα1 (k) and then
stored in the form of phase-scrambled DFT coeﬃcients in
a system. When the system is queried with respect to g2(n),
g2(n) is scrambled by θα2 (k), and the POC between G˜1(k) and
G˜2(k) is then performed. In other words, G˜1(k) and G˜2(k) are
given as
G˜1(k) = G1(k) · e jθα1 (k),
G˜2(k) = G2(k) · e jθα2 (k).
(8)
The normalized cross spectrum R˜φ(k) is calculated as
R˜φ(k) = φ˜∗G1 (k) · φ˜G2 (k). (9)






When the key sequence for the template and that for the
query are the same, the POC under phase scrambling and the
POC between nonscrambled signals are identical. Namely, if
for all k, θα1 (k) = θα2 (k), then by substituting (5) into (9), we
obtain the following:
R˜φ(k) = φ∗G1 (k)e− jθα1 (k) · φG2 (k)e jθα1 (k) = Rφ(k). (11)
From (3), (10), and (11), we therefore obtain
r˜φ(n) = rφ(n). (12)
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(d) U2π/6 = {π/6,−π/6}
Figure 3: Diﬀerence of phases.
Thus, a key sequence is used for both the template and the
query, and these two key sequences are synchronized. In the
proposed method, a key sequence is used for a template only.
3. Proposed Image Matching and Visual
Information Protection
One-time key based phase scrambling is proposed and
analyzed statistically. In the present paper, the set for key
sequences is limited to a two-member set.
3.1. One-Time Key Based Phase Scrambling for POC. A
binary key sequence is used only once for scrambling a
template and is not required for image matching.
The binary key sequence is constructed from a set of only
two members, x1 and x2, that is,
θα1 (k) ∈ U2x1 = {x1, x2}. (13)
For an N-point signal, a binary key sequence of length N is
generated using a cryptographically secure pseudo random
number generator, the output of which belongs to either x1
or x2. Let qx1 be the occurrence probability of x1, and let δ be
the diﬀerence of phases, x1−x2, examples of which are shown
in Figure 3.
Let g1(n) and g2(n) be a template and a query, respec-
tively. In a system, g1(n) is scrambled by θα1 (k) ∈ U2x1
according to (4) and is stored in the form of G˜1(k). When the
system is queried with respect to g2(n), its DFT coeﬃcients,
G2(k), are multiplied by a constant, that is,
G˜1(k) = G1(k) · e jθα1 (k), (14)
G˜2(k) = G2(k) · e jx1(k). (15)
The POC between G˜1(k) and G˜2(k) is calculated according to
(9) and (10).
Although (12) is not satisfied under one-time key based
phase scrambling, the peak value of rφ(n), which is used as a
measure of signal congruence, is estimated from r˜φ(n) using
parameters that are explained in the following section.
3.2. Eﬀect of One-Time Key Based Phase Scrambling. The
eﬀect on the peak value of POC is considered in terms of the
average value of POC under the proposed scrambling.
From (5), (9), (14) and (15), R˜φ(k) is expressed as
R˜φ(k) = φ˜∗G1 (k) · φ˜G2 (k)
= φ∗G1 (k)e− jθα1 (k) · φG2 (k)e jx1
= Rφ(k)e j(x1−θα1 (k)).
(16)
Here, we assume that the key sequence is a single value, that
is, if for all k, θαi(k) = xC , then
R˜φ(k) = Rφ(k)e j(x1−xC) (17)
and since e j(x1−xC) is a constant, from (10), r˜φ(n) can be
obtained as
r˜φ(n) = e j(x1−xC)rφ(n). (18)
Under the above assumption, if xC = x1, then
r˜φ(n) = rφ(n), (19)
and if xC = x2, then
r˜φ(n) = e j(x1−x2)rφ(n). (20)
From (19) and (20), the average value of r˜φ(n), that is,
r˜φave (n), is defined in terms of qx1 as follows:
r˜φave (n) = qx1 · rφ(n) +
(
1− qx1
) · e jδ · rφ(n). (21)
Since r˜φave (n) is a complex number, the real and imaginary














) · sin(δ) · rφ(n),
(22)
where Re[·] and Im[·] denote the operations to obtain the
real and imaginary parts, respectively, of signals, and their








= ∣∣qx1 p +
(
1− qx1










) · sin(δ) · p∣∣, (24)
where p denotes the peak value of rφ(n), which is referred to
as the original peak value.
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The peak value of POC under one-time key based phase
scrambling is approximated by the average value of POC
































Based on the above consideration, we observe the
following.
Adjustment of the Peak Value. The peak value of r˜φ(n) can
be controlled using the occurrence probability, qx1 , and the
diﬀerence of phases, δ, as parameters. If queries are expected
to contain noise, which causes a lower peak value, the peak
value can be adjusted using parameters qx1 and δ to be higher
within (23) and (24).
Invalid Parameters for the Proposed Scrambling. There is a
set of invalid parameters for one-time key based phase
scrambling. From (24), we obtain δ = π + 2πl, l ∈
Z such that, for qx1 /= 0, maxn (|Im[r˜φave (n)]|) = 0. From
(23), we obtain qx1 = 0.5 such that, for δ = π + 2πl,
max
n




) = (0.5,π + 2πl), l ∈ Z. (26)
Estimation of the Original Peak Value. The original peak
value, p, can be estimated from r˜φ(n) using parameters qx1
and δ, and thereby the eﬀect of scrambling can be practically
avoided. From (23) and (24), the original peak value, p, can

























) · sin(δ)) .
(27)
3.3. Eﬀect on Visual Information. We consider the error
energy between the phase scrambled signal and the non-
scrambled signal, in which the larger error energy provides
greater visual protection.
Let g˜i(n) be the scrambled signal of the original signal,





Gi(k)e jθαi (k)W−nkN . (28)
Here, we assume that the key sequence is a single value, that











= e jxC gi(n).
(29)
Under the above assumption, since g˜i(n) is a complex









] = sin(xC) · gi(n). (31)
The real part of the error energy, Er , between the original
























If xC = x1, then
Er = |1− cos(x1)|2 · Cgi (35)
and if xC = x2, then
Er = |1− cos(x2)|2 · Cgi . (36)
The average, Er , of the real part of the error energy, Er , is
defined in terms of the occurrence probability, qx1 , as
Er = qx1|1− cos(x1)|2 · Cgi +
(
1− qx1
)|1− cos(x2)|2 · Cgi .
(37)
The average of the imaginary part of the error energy is
defined in a similar manner. The imaginary part of the error
energy, Ei, between the original signal and the imaginary part
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(a) template (b) query
Figure 4: Template and query. (a) Template: 512× 512, 8 bits/pixel.
(b) The query is generated by translation from (a) by 20 pixels in
the horizontal and vertical directions.
The average, Ei, of Ei is defined with qx1 as
Ei = qx1|1− sin(x1)|2 · Cgi +
(
1− qx1
)|1− sin(x2)|2 · Cgi .
(39)
The visual eﬀect of phase-scrambled signals can be
estimated from (37) and (39), as will be shown in Section 4.2.
The parameters for key sequence are selected based on
both the average error energy and the eﬀect on the peak value
discussed in Section 3.2.
3.4. Security Consideration. A key sequence based on a user-
specified key is generated using a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator. A key sequence is used
only once for scrambling a template. If the scrambled
template does not need to be reconstructed in a system,
the key sequence can be discarded after scrambling, and,
consequently, its protection is not required. In the following,
we focus on the known-plaintext attack and the ciphertext-
only attack.
3.4.1. Known-Plaintext Attack. This model assumes that an
attacker has samples of both a plaintext and its ciphertext and
uses them to reveal further secret information, such as secret
keys and code books.
In a system using the proposed scrambling, each template
is scrambled by an independent key sequence. Accordingly,
even if an attacker obtains sets of a plaintext and its
ciphertext, the other key sequences cannot be inferred by
these sets.
3.4.2. Ciphertext-Only Attack. This model assumes that an
attacker accesses only a ciphertext.
In this model, there are two approaches by which to
deduce the original template:
(1) using a local image possessed by an attacker.
(2) guessing a key sequence.
With respect to the former approach, although the original
template can be inferred using the signal congruence from
the POC between a scrambled template and a local image
possessed by an attacker, or through other methods using
such a local image, even if an attack is successful, the attacker
has already had access to a closely related image; the contents
of which are already known to the attacker prior to the
attack. Namely, the situation is considered as a case in which
the information has been already leaked. The aim of the
proposed scrambling is to prevent the information leakage
from a template itself. The inference by using a local image
is therefore excluded from the scope of the protection of the
proposed scrambling.
With respect to the latter approach, theoretically, even if
in the case of a brute force attack, as in the case of the one-
time pad, which is unconditionally secure and theoretically
unbreakable, it is impossible to confirm whether an inferred
key sequence is correct. Since not a binary bit but a coherent
unit of phase is changed, the scrambled template can be
practically inferred by brute force attack although complete
restoration is impossible for the above-described reason.
Consequently, the proposed scrambling protects the visual
information of the original template within the scope of key
space and completely protects the original template. If the
size of a template is N ×N , the key space is 2N×N . We assume
the size of a template to be adequate.
When a system requires much higher security, the
proposed scrambling can be combined with other crypto-
graphic techniques. Even if decryption is required for image
matching, the eﬀect of the proposed scrambling remains
valid.
4. Simulations
4.1. POC under the Proposed Scrambling. We performed
POC between two images under one-time key based phase
scrambling to show that both translation and signal congru-
ence can be estimated even under scrambling.
In the following simulations, we used a 512×512 section
of a 1, 024 × 1, 024, 8-bits/pixel image called “pentagon”, as
a template and a query, as shown in Figure 4. The template
and query were translated by 20 pixels in the horizontal and
vertical directions. The template was scrambled by a key
sequence, θαi(k1, k2), according to (4). After the query was
processed according to (15), POC was performed between
the template and the query. The translation and signal
congruence were then estimated from the observed peak of
the POC surface.
4.1.1. Without Noise. First, we evaluated the peak value
by controlling the parameters for key sequences. The
key sequence θαi(k1, k2) was generated using the sets of
{π/2,−π/2}, that is, δ = π with qπ/2 = 0.5 to 0.95,
and {a,−a}, a = π/8 to π/2 with qa = 0.5, respectively.
The original peak value, p, which is the peak value of the
POC between the non-processed template and query, was
0.8264.
The real parts of POC surfaces for the cases in which
θαi(k1, k2) ∈ {π/2,−π/2} with qπ/2 = 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5, are
shown in Figures 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c), respectively. Peaks
appeared on the POC surfaces, and the observed peak values
were 0.3291, 0.1675, and 0.0062, respectively. The observed
































































(c) pπ/2 = 0.5















































Figure 6: Real and imaginary parts of the POC surface without noise. θαi (k1, k2) ∈ {3π/8,−3π/8}, (δ = 3π/4) with q3π/8 = 0.5.



















































(c) θαi (k1, k2) ∈ {π/3,−π/3}, qπ/3 = 0.5
Figure 7: Translation estimation without noise using a total of 1,000 diﬀerent key sequences. The “×” symbols denote the estimated
translation, which is the peak location on the POC surface. The “∇” symbols denote the degeneracy of the “×” plots. The translation
can be estimated correctly for all but the set of invalid parameters.
peak value was confirmed to decrease according to (23) as
qπ/2 approaches 0.5 for δ = π, and, for the case in which
δ = π and qπ/2 = 0.5, that is, the set of invalid parameters, a
distinct peak did not appear on the POC surface.
The real and imaginary parts are shown in Figures 6(a)
and 6(b), respectively, of the POC surface for the case in
which θαi(k1, k2) ∈ {3π/8,−3π/8}, that is, δ = 3π/4, with
q3π/8 = 0.5. A peak appears in both the real and imaginary
parts of the POC surface.
The error between the observed and calculated peak
values are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The observed peak
values in the tables denote the average peak values observed
on the POC surface for a total of 20 diﬀerent key sequences.
The peak value of POC under the proposed scrambling can
be adjusted by controlling the parameters according to (23)
and (24), which also means that the original peak value
can be estimated from the observed peak value using the
parameters according to (27).
Next, we investigated the peak location on the POC
surface. A total of 1,000 diﬀerent key sequences, which were
generated using the sets of {π/2,−π/2} with qπ/2 = 0.5,
{π/3,−π/3} with qπ/3 = 0.5, and {π/2,−π/2} with qπ/2 =
0.7, were considered.
The estimated locations for diﬀerent key sequences are
shown in Figure 7. For the case in which θαi(k1, k2) ∈
{π/2,−π/2} with qπ/2 = 0.5, that is, the set of invalid
parameters, the translation was not estimated correctly, as
shown in Figure 7(a). For the cases in which θαi(k1, k2) ∈
{π/2,−π/2} with qπ/2 = 0.7 and θαi(k1, k2) ∈ {π/3,−π/3}
with qπ/3 = 0.5, the translation was estimated correctly, as
shown in Figures 7(b) and 7(c), respectively. Estimation of
the translation from POC under the proposed scrambling






















































































(b) with JPEG quantization noise
Figure 8: Real part of POC surface with noise. θαi (k1, k2) ∈ {π/2,−π/2}. (a) The query is corrupted by additive noise (Gaussian random
numbers with zero mean and a standard deviation of 25). (b) The query is corrupted by JPEG quantization noise (Q-factor = 200).
Table 1: Error between the observed and calculated peak values of the real part of the POC surface. θαi (k1, k2) ∈ {π/2,−π/2}, that is, δ = π,
with qπ/2 = 0.55 to 0.95.
qπ/2 Observed peak value Calculated peak value Error
0.55 0.0829 0.0826 0.0003
0.60 0.1653 0.1652 −0.0001
0.65 0.2482 0.2478 0.0004
0.70 0.3307 0.3304 0.0003
0.75 0.4136 0.4130 0.0006
0.80 0.4954 0.4956 −0.0002
0.85 0.5785 0.5782 0.0003
0.90 0.6614 0.6608 0.0006
0.95 0.7440 0.7434 0.0006
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qπ/2 = 0.9 qπ/2 = 0.8 qπ/2 = 0.7 qπ/2 = 0.6 qπ/2 = 0.5
(a) real part
qπ/2 = 0.9 qπ/2 = 0.8 qπ/2 = 0.7 qπ/2 = 0.6 qπ/2 = 0.5
(b) imaginary part
Figure 9: Real and imaginary parts of phase-scrambled images. Image “Lena” (512 × 512, 8 bits/pixel) is scrambled by θαi (k1, k2) ∈
{π/2,−π/2}, that is, δ = π with occurrence probability qπ/2 = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9.










































Figure 10: Average error energy over Cgi . Image “Lena” (512 × 512, 8 bits/pixel) is scrambled by θαi (k1, k2) ∈ {π/2,−π/2}, that is, δ = π
with occurrence probability qπ/2 = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9.
Table 2: Error between the observed and calculated peak values of the real and imaginary parts of the POC surface. θαi (k1, k2) ∈ {a,−a},
that is, δ = 2a, with qa = 0.5.
a Part Observed peak value Calculated peak value Error
π/2 Real 0.0064 0.0000 0.0064
π/2 Imaginary 0.0064 0.0000 0.0064
3π/8 Real 0.1212 0.1210 0.0002
3π/8 Imaginary 0.2924 0.2922 0.0002
π/4 Real 0.4132 0.4132 0.0000
π/4 Imaginary 0.4131 0.4132 −0.0001
π/8 Real 0.7055 0.7054 0.0001
π/8 Imaginary 0.2922 0.2922 0.0000
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has been demonstrated to be possible for all but the set of
invalid parameters.
4.1.2. With Noise. We evaluated the noise version of POC
under the proposed scrambling. The key sequence was
generated by the set of {π/2,−π/2} with qπ/2 = 0.7 and 0.5.
The POC surface between the template and the query that
was corrupted by additive noise is shown in Figure 8(a). The
noise consists of Gaussian random numbers with zero mean
and a standard deviation of 25. Under this condition, the
original peak value was 0.2433. The POC surface between
the template and the query that was corrupted by JPEG
quantization noise is shown in Figure 8(b). The Q-factor was
200.( 8× 8 DCT coeﬃcients are divided by the quantization
step Q(k1, k2), which is generated by QT(k1, k2) · QF/50,
where QT(k1, k2), and QF denotes a predefined quantization
table and aQ-factor, resp.). Under this condition, the original
peak value was 0.1779. When qπ/2 = 0.7, a peak that expresses
the translation appeared on the POC surface at the location
(20, 20) in both conditions and the peak values were 0.0982
and 0.0714, respectively. We confirmed that even when the
query is corrupted by noise, the original peak value under
the condition can be estimated from the observed peak value
on the POC surface under the proposed scrambling.
4.2. Visual Eﬀect and the Average Error Energy. We compared
the visual eﬀect of a phase-scrambled image with the average
error energy in order to demonstrate the validity of the
discussion in Section 3.3. We used a 512 × 512, 8 bits/pixel
image called “Lena”. The key sequence was generated from
the set of {π/2,−π/2}, with qπ/2 = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9.
The average error energy was calculated according to (37)
and (39) using the parameters {a,−a}, that is, δ = 2a, for
a = 0 to π/2 and qπ/2 = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9.
The real and imaginary parts of the phase-scrambled
images are shown in Figures 9(a) and 9(b), respectively.
The real part of the phase-scrambled images is invisible and
shows almost no variation, whereas the imaginary part of
the phase-scrambled images is degraded as the occurrence
probability approaches 0.5. The real and imaginary parts of
the average error energy calculated from (37) and (39) are
shown in Figures 10(a) and 10(b), respectively. When a =
π/2, the average of the real part of the error energy is constant
regardless of the occurrence probability, whereas the average
of the imaginary part of the error energy increases as the
occurrence probability approaches 0.5. The average error
energy is confirmed to coincide with the visual eﬀect of the
phase-scrambled image.
If templates are required to be invisible, the parameters
should be set as close to the set of invalid parameters as
possible.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed one-time key based phase scrambling
for image matching. Protecting the original information of
the template visually for privacy and security, the proposed
method enables keyless image matching. The occurrence
probability of a member and the diﬀerence of phases were
discussed for the one-time key based phase scrambling.
These parameters can control the eﬀect of visual protection
and the peak value of POC. The eﬀectiveness of visual
protection has been demonstrated by the error energy
between the phase-scrambled image and the original image.
The peak value of one-time key based phase scrambling
for the case of the two-member set has been explained
theoretically. Experimental results revealed the eﬀectiveness
and appropriateness of the proposed method. In the future,
a theoretical explanation for the case of a multiple-member
set and the degree of robustness against attacks will be
considered.
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